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The idea of  public experience is often invoked in different social and academic contexts. However, it seldom 
deserved a reflection that specifically sought to deepen its meaning from the point of view of social life. In this 
article we contribute to the understanding of the uniqueness of the public form of experience. We believe that 
one of the best ways through which we can observe the public experience is by the objectification, performance 
and dramatization of the culture, i.e., the “expression of lived experiences”. There is, in publicity, the possibil-
ity of simultaneous allocation of individual and collective experiences, and it is in this sense that we can see 
how culture influences the shaping of experience itself. Public experience is characterized by the weaving and 
intertwining of singular experiences that are pluralized and plural lived experiences that are singularized, in a 
process where individual and society interpenetrate. The relationship between experience and publicity arises 
from this symbolic communion contained in the systems of thought and action of societies. The decisive role 
of the principle of publicity to experience consists, according with the hypothesis we wish to put forward, 
in making available and communicating the social world of symbolic (cultural) activity. Public experience 
is, then, envisaged as the experience of a common world where both singular and plural definitions of the 
individual (taken as society) converge through lived experiences and, particularly, through their expression, 
which can take different symbolic forms.
keywords: Erfahrung, Erlebnis, experience, expression of lived experiences, principle of publicity, public 
experience, public sphere, Wilhelm Dilthey.
“Yet all experience is an arch where through/
Gleams that untraveled world whose margin fades/
Forever and forever when I move”.
Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Ulysses (2007, first edition in 1842) 
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Introduction
What is the relationship between experience 
and publicity, i.e., how can we gauge public 
experience? And, furthermore, what is its im-
portance in contemporary societies? Both ques-
tions form the interpretive framework of the 
link between lived experiences and the publicity 
process. One of the preferred ways to recog-
nize the fluidity of public experience has been 
through the concept of “lived experience”. As 
a specialization of the comprehensive concept 
of experience, this apparent minuteness, which 
stands out from the experiential continuum, is 
the support point of the analysis of the publicity 
process from the point of view of its connection 
with experience.
As underlined by symbolic interactionism 
or interpretive anthropology, we have to remove 
the subjectivist/cognitivist fallacy from such 
concepts like “mind”, “culture” or “experience”, 
and identify, in these complex meanings, a re-
newed, constructed and transformed symbolic 
system1. Indeed, taken as a performative and 
transformational process, experience is some-
thing that can be shaped and experimented; the 
individual’s experience is both an experiment 
of the self and of the world. If we accept this 
hypothesis, of an interventional experience, it 
is not difficult to recognize the need to bring 
to the discussion the publicity process. It is be-
cause experience is an ecosystem consisting of 
signs and it is because it consists of symbolically 
mediated interpretations and activities, that 
experience can be observed from the point of 
view of publicity.
If the construction of culture, as a symbolic 
signifier that confers meaning and describes the 
1 Notwithstanding the undoubted richness and va-
lue of the phenomenological approach to social 
life, perhaps it is no exaggeration to note that its 
methodological weakness lies in the defense of su-
bjectivist tendencies that put emphasis on an in-
ner state rather than the type of relationships that 
the individual, as a social actor, undertakes. Alfred 
Schuütz’s social phenomenology somehow restrains 
this tendency, although not eliminating it complete-
ly (1967). 
world, is a process of public construction of a 
social reality, then, experience – understood as 
something that one experiences but also dares 
to try and take ownership of – is the subject 
of publicity. Culture is the fabric of meaning 
through which human beings interpret their 
experience and guide their actions (Geertz 
1973: 145). Culture is a public fact. The blink 
of an eye does not exist only in the minds of 
one or two individuals; its intangible mean-
ing exists in social reality. If human activity is 
seen as symbolic action – whether a painting, a 
book, a speech or a musical score – we have to 
consider how it is patterned (Geertz 1973: 10), 
i.e., how it is publicly performed by the plurality 
of individuals.
The discourse on publicity is not so inter-
ested in describing anger, pride or irony for 
example but, instead, on what is being socially 
communicated and declared about these be-
haviours. To Clifford Geertz, culture is public 
precisely because it is made up of the circulation 
of significant symbols (shared and used by all) 
that impose meaning on experience. 
“Undirected by culture patterns-organized 
systems of significant symbols-man’s behaviour 
would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos 
of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his 
experience virtually shapeless. Culture, the ac-
cumulated totality of such patterns, is not just 
an ornament of human existence but-the princi-
pal basis of its specificity-an essential condition 
for it” (Geertz 1973: 46).
Thus, culture is a key element of experience. 
And for that reason, experience – if culture is 
to be the public and symbolic construction of 
the world – is itself a public fact. Without sig-
nificant symbols, without the effect of publicity 
and communication, experience would be a se-
quence of unregulated, random and incoherent 
sensations and behaviours. Without the role of 
culture and publicity, culture would be no more 
than an inconsequential babble. The whole ex-
perience is captured through a web of symbols 
139CoaCtivity: Philosophy, Communication  2016, 24(2): 137–147
and meanings that mediate our access to the 
objectifications and materialities of the social 
world. But this only occurs under the influence 
of publicity, through a communication process 
that ensures the sharing of symbolic activity. 
This means that not only the effectiveness and 
meaning of symbolic forms lies in its ability to 
organize experience, but also that experience 
depends of the strong presence of publicity as a 
means of expanding this dynamic and pervasive 
network of symbols.
These systems of symbolic forms that the 
word “culture” summarizes constitute our 
experience of the world. The decisive role of 
the principle of publicity for the experience 
is, then, to make accessible, to communicate 
the social world of symbolic activity. Against 
essentialism, where the experience would be a 
finished product, the idea of publicity adduces 
a dynamic, constructive and experimental ar-
gument of the experience. Experience has an 
essential public nature, insofar it is mediated by 
culturally modelled systems of linguistic, sym-
bolic and representational forms (cf. Throop 
2003: 226). The role of the publicity process is 
also exponentiated by the undetermined, fluid 
and disjunctive nature that guides experience. 
Without conceiving a principle of publicity, it 
would be more difficult to describe how the 
unity and structuring of experience evolves, 
adapts and is modified. Without considering 
the quality of publicity, it would seem also 
implausible to separate the two meanings of 
the experience contained in the German words 
Erfahrung and Erlebnis. Indeed, ignoring, in the 
analysis of social life, a principle like publicity – 
able to simultaneously sustain the fragmentary 
and the whole – any serious reference to lived 
experiences would promptly fall in the dome 
of solipsism.
In fact, it is because we possess a trans-cul-
tural and millennial concept of “publicity”2 that 
the relationship between the singular and plural 
definitions of the individual can be obtained, 
2 An argument developed in my PhD Thesis (Mateus 
2012). 
and any given behaviour (premeditated, inten-
tional or spontaneous) can be communicated to 
other individuals, and therefore can be adopted 
in the actions of others, thereby becoming part 
of the experience. There is, therefore, in pub-
licity the possibility of simultaneous inclusion 
of individual and collective experience, and 
it is in this sense that we can see how culture 
influences the shaping of experience. Social 
structures of meaning contribute to the shap-
ing of experience precisely because meaning is 
public. The relationship between experience and 
publicity arises in this symbolic communion 
that systems of thought and action of socie-
ties contain. Without publicity (and without 
its communicational aspect, which of course 
cannot be ignored) experience might not hold 
its constitutive fluidity and adaptive transience.
The mutuality of experience derives from 
the inherent relationship between experience, 
communication and publicity. When I under-
stand my actions and the experience of my ac-
tions through my situation in the world, what I 
understand from my experience and from the 
experience of others come from a set of typifica-
tions and cultural and social structures. Bruce 
Kapferer calls it “the universalizing character 
of culture”: 
“Any uniqueness that can be in my ex-
perience is widespread and lost in a set of 
constructs, concepts or of crime socially con-
stituted. These stand between me and humans, 
between the immediacy of my experience and 
the experience of another person” (Kapferer 
1986: 190).
It is precisely in this sense that culture is 
public and that publicity is a key concept in a 
reflection about experience. The principle of 
publicity embodies this universalizing nature 
of culture, assuming that the experience of a 
person can reach others and that a singular 
experience can be pluralized and communi-
cated. The elaborations and symbolic forms 
which, through the publicity process, operate 
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the mediation of the world and, therefore, the 
formation of experience, are crucial in the in-
tersubjective sharing of experience.
However, what is shared by publicity is not 
the entirety of the experience in its absolute 
immediacy3. The commonality of experience 
triggers the activation of typifications and 
symbolic forms. Experience becomes public 
not because it shares the experience itself, but 
rather the possible interpretations that come 
with it. In publicity, it is the conceptions and 
appropriations of the experience that circulate, 
rather than the singular experience per se. The 
universalizing nature of culture, which allows 
the mutuality of experience, thus consecrates 
the public sharing of assumptions that allow 
the assessment and understanding, collectively, 
of the experience. The universalization of the 
particular and the particularization of the uni-
versal, present in the principle of publicity are 
two of the factors that contribute to the public 
nature of the experience and the possibility of 
it being subject to intersubjective sharing. One 
aspect regarding the mutuality of experience 
that has been analysed in greater detail and 
which reveals, in a unique way, the centrality 
of the publicity process is art (Dewey 2012) or 
the ritual (Turner 1986), precisely because their 
performances contain this ability to synthesize 
the individual and the collective.
dramatization and public experience
It is at the point that we locate the (communica-
tional) role of publicity on the mutuality of ex-
perience (Erfahrung) that we are faced with its 
most vital sense: the lived experience (Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s Erlebnis). Lived experiences are often 
made  of a dramatization of experience4, of per-
3 That would mean to accept the ontology of “ex-
perience” parallel to the ontological status of the 
Essence (cf. the debate around nominalism and ex-
istentialism).
4 It is not an accident that Dilthey (1945) associated 
Erlebnis to poetry.
formance, of the staging and public encounter 
between the singular and the plural definition 
of the individual. It is in the dramatization, for 
example, of media rites (cf. Couldry 2003), that 
experience reaches an emotional climax that 
destroys the symbolic distance that societies 
sometimes build. There is therefore a dramatic 
dimension of experience that lived experiences 
put into practice, and where the intensity of 
public experience transcends any deferral and 
allows the communication of intersubjective 
sharing.
Even in conflict or dissension, public ex-
perience is an experience that is staged and 
aestheticized, an experience that dramatizes 
the existence. Think of the social figuration: the 
carnation as a symbol of the peaceful revolution 
in Portugal, the caricature as figurative repre-
sentation of social criticism, the song as po-
litical resistance5. Therefore, public experience, 
inasmuch as it consists of lived experiences, is 
an amplified feel where dramatization achieves 
what rational judgment cannot. Dramatization 
allows us thus to observe a fundamental aspect 
of public experience: lived experiences as cul-
tural expressions. Indeed, public experience 
cannot be confined to a purely hermeneutic, 
phenomenological or subjectivist understand-
ing. If lived experiences, which characterize the 
public inhabitation of experience, contemplate 
this subjective dimension, if experiences belong 
to an individual who suffers and experiments6 
life, they are not mere objects of interiority. 
5 A quick search on the Internet offers us the most 
varied examples of this figuration which experi-
ences of public experience contain. Social manifes-
tations of 2 March, 2012, in Portugal, illustrate not 
only the figurative dramatization of existence, but 
also how publicity fuels the (collective) experience 
and where the “heroic song” “Acordai” (English: 
Awake!) by Fernando Lopes-Graça is wielded and 
sung like a cry of protest against the economic crisis 
and the financial intervention of Troika (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, European Union, European 
Central Bank) in the country.
6 This is not to say that the individual experiences life. 
We want, in contrast, to stress the sense of trial as in 
the Latin word experimentum.
141CoaCtivity: Philosophy, Communication  2016, 24(2): 137–147
What the dramatization of the experience sug-
gests is the possibility to also consider lived ex-
periences as public expressions that break out in 
a world of inter-subjective experience mediated 
by cultural and social forms (cf. Turner 1986). 
To the extent that culture and meaning are 
public, dramatization contributes to the social 
and collective expression of lived experiences. 
The public experience, made  up of these lived 
experiences, is then characterized by cultural 
expressions objectified in the materiality, figura-
tion and symbolicity of culture.
A question could be raised: if the public 
experience (Erfahrung) is associated with lived 
experiences (Erlebnissen), is it reasonable to 
attribute to the lived experience – with experi-
ential and subjective contours – a public, hence, 
collective dimension? That is, how can we 
begin to understand that a concept like “lived 
experience”, so close to subjectivity, can serve 
as a basis for understanding public experience, 
a social experience, collective and plural7? Is it 
not the example of an oxymoron, a contradic-
tion in its own terms? For it is precisely because 
the publicity process operates the transition 
between the singular and plural definitions 
of the individual that one can perceive public 
experience as lived experience. The objectified 
manifestation of culture, the dramatization 
and the figuration of experiences, play out the 
cultural expression of those lived experiences 
that were initiated in the individual feeling but 
found a resonance in the society.
In his Descriptive Psychology and Historical 
Understanding, Dilthey was aware of the risks 
in which the Erlebnis could incur if it did not 
counterbalance the introspective and “interior” 
dimensions of the lived experience with the 
social and cultural projections of the experience 
(see Dilthey 1977). He opposes, then, introspec-
tion to “the objectified” projection of the human 
consciousness (objectiver Geist Ausdrucken). 
To the end product of the mental activity 
transposed to the world, he calls “objectified 
7 One possibility is the hermeneutical one (for this 
approach see Lindseth, Norberg 2004). 
spirit” (objectiver Geist) or “cultural expression” 
(kultureller Ausdruck) (Dilthey 1989). The ob-
servation of the inner experience is not enough 
to understand the complexities of the human 
condition since the psychic life is rarely given 
in a coherent or total form. Dilthey argues that 
the examination of the creations or expressions 
of the human mind are an indirect form to ac-
cede to those parts of the psychic life that are 
not given directly to the introspection (Throop 
2002: 9). He is, thus, underlining the impor-
tance of the expressions of the Erlebnis as way 
to discern consciousness. Simultaneously, he is 
extending the approach since the immediate 
experience, the lived experience (Erlebnis) until 
the culturally mediated experience (Erfahrung) 
(Ermarth 1978: 276–277).
Lived experiences possess a natural ten-
dency to crystallize in expressions that are not 
identical to the lived experience but that repre-
sent it, signified it and figure it. The expression 
of the lived experience (Ausdruck Erleben) 
is described by Dilthey as a complement of 
self-experience, since, while this provides the 
interior experience with an objective reference, 
the expression of the lived experience is exactly 
what makes the interior experience a public 
experience (Throop 2002: 9). Said in another 
way, the expression of the lived experience is 
what allows binding the interior psychic struc-
ture of a man with the exterior structure of the 
socio-historical world (Tillman 1976: 124). A 
pivot between individual and society, between 
internal and external structures, expression is 
what allows the possibility of gauging mental 
and cultural facts. Consequently, Dilthey could 
formulate the understanding process (verste-
hen) as the principle through which we can 
reconstruct the crystallized mental life in the 
most diverse forms of expression of the lived 
experience:
“Everywhere we see the mixing, in vary-
ing degrees, the relationship of personal lived 
experience with the expression, and the rela-
tionship between what happens on the outside 
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and understanding. Because personal lived 
experience implies a State of mind, but at the 
same time, [involves] the objectivity of the 
surrounding world. Understanding and recre-
ating we capture the life of the spirit of others 
but always through the life of the soul that she 
infuses” (Dilthey 1945: 141). 
The interdependence between lived experi-
ence and expression is what truly constitutes 
the hermeneutic circle. It is from Diltheyan 
objectivation of the mind that, for example, 
Victor Turner affirms that the collection of 
“congregated expressions” of a specific com-
munity as objectified mind is nothing other 
than Diltheyan version of culture (Turner 1982: 
14). In fact, he describes this process in a very 
similar way to that of Dilthey’s: 
“the conception of culture that we possess 
is based on the assumption that we can meet 
the subjective depths, whether through insight, 
either via the scrutiny of significant objectiva-
tions ‘expressed’ by others. In a complementary 
manner, the scrutiny of the self can give us clues 
about the penetration of life objectivations gen-
erated from the experience of others” (Turner 
1982: 14). 
Or, as Geertz writes: “Whatever the sense 
we make of the inner life of another person, we 
look for it through his expressions, not through 
some magical intrusion on his conscience. It’s 
all a matter of scratching the surface” (Geertz 
1986: 373).
Dilthey’s idea of  “expression” can help us 
understand two things more clearly: first, it 
helps to explain how through symbolic forms 
can the individual access the private sphere 
of the subjectivity of others; on the other 
hand, the concept helps us to describe and 
understand how lived experiences may form 
the basis of public experience, and how the 
individual experience can add to the collective 
experience.
The expression of lived experiences
The expression of experiences relies in the op-
erative idea of the very notion of culture in that 
it concerns the transcendence of subjectivity 
and individual initiative through objectified 
expressions (performances, figurations, drama, 
imaginaries, linguistic representations, frames 
of meaning, ideologies and ideologics, social 
practices etc.). We observe, therefore, how 
lived experiences cohabit the symbolic space 
of expressions, and how the individual and the 
social merge together. 
In an effort of definition, we would say 
public experience is an experience consisting of 
lives experiences that are expressed, in an ob-
jectified manner, in various forms of symbolic 
representation. It is a special kind of experience, 
since it is doubly a lived experience: a lived 
experience for someone but, simultaneously, 
lived and experienced by many others. It is in 
this back-and-forth that the publicity of expe-
rience takes place and the public experience is 
realized in all the objectified expressions that 
so distinguish it.
Cultural expressions are symbolic materiali-
zations that enclose lived experiences. Indeed, 
lived experiences and expressions seem to be 
dialectically related: not only we understand 
others and their expressions based on our lived 
experience, as these expressions, due to their 
social and public nature, also structure the 
experience of people, in the sense that the meta-
narratives, rituals, festivals, art and ceremonies 
help define and illuminate the lived experience 
(Bruner 1986: 6). Experience is thus culturally 
invested. The great founding texts (Oedipus 
the King, Don Quixote, Hamlet) are intense, 
complex and intricate expressions of life itself, 
enriching this experience while clarifying it:
“Our knowledge of what is given in the lived 
experience is amplified through the interpreta-
tion of life objectivations, and their interpreta-
tions, in turn, are only possible if we dive into 
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the depths of subjective experience” (Dilthey 
1976: 195).
Expressions introduce us in a fundamental 
distinction between the lived life (reality), the 
experienced life (lived experience), and life as 
it is narrated (expressions) (cf. Bruner 1986: 
6). Expressions are socially constructed lived 
experiences, a cultural product subject to the 
inescapable tension between reality and expe-
rience. Therefore, expressions, because they 
are cultural expressions, are never static or 
definitive texts; they always involve a proce-
dural activity re-enacted ad aeternum. This is 
proved by the dynamism of the publicity pro-
cess and the expressions that circulate within 
it. Experiences have to be expressed and, 
therefore, every year and every day, new rites 
have to be performed, new ceremonies have to 
be publicly acknowledged, new dramas have to 
be re-presented and reinterpreted within the 
publicity process.
Social life consists of these symbolic ex-
pressions. The importance of publicity (and 
its communicational nature) lies in the dis-
semination and generalization imprinted in 
these expressions, allowing lived experiences 
to be transformed into experiences (personal 
or collective):
“The lived experience precipitates towards 
the expression or communication with the 
other. We are social beings and we want to 
share what we learn from our experience. Art 
depends on this urgency of confession or dec-
lamation. The meanings must be told, painted, 
dance, dramatized, put into circulation. In this 
case the urgency of the peacock display is indis-
tinguishable from ritual need to communicate” 
(Turner 1986: 37).
Hence, the major lesson that the notion of 
“expression” associated with public experience 
– cultural experience and socially lived – entails 
is not that experiences are unique and idiosyn-
cratic; it is that, first of all, experience is socially 
organized and has a publicity principle that al-
lows it to be shared, owned and re-created over 
time. From this point of view, public experience 
is a combination of lived experiences socially 
and culturally ordered through the expressions 
and symbolic forms that circulate within in. The 
expression of lived experiences acts as a kind of 
yeast added to communication seen as a com-
munal experience:
“The expression transgresses the barriers 
that separate human beings. Given that art is 
the most universal language form, given that is 
woven [...] from common qualities that belong 
to the public world, she is the most universal 
and unrestricted form of communication” 
(Dewey 2012: 440). 
It is due to its communicational character 
that public experience is a shared and commune 
experience, the expressions of experiences 
acquiring consistency through the repeated 
practice of collective organization of experience. 
The expressions of lived experiences, stemming 
from communication, have a huge a capacity of 
putting in relation, of comprehensive convivial-
ity, of social revitalization. Public experience 
is an experience of collective tuning, it is an 
experience of amendment of perspectives, of 
adjustment of attention, and lived experience. 
Public experience in expressing itself, in com-
municating, becomes “the” experience.
Given the multiple expressions of experi-
ence, we may characterize public experience as 
a set of lived experiences that societies articulate 
as a way of organizing and accomplishing the 
Experience. Public experience – made up of 
successive lived experiences and its expres-
sions – is located on the level of a plurality 
of individuals. This means that it is a trans-
individual phenomenon: it does not correspond 
to purely individual experiences and neither to 
completely collectivized ones. It operates at the 
junction between these two registers of experi-
ence, between the subjectivity and objectivity 
that determines social processes.
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The public dimension of experience is vola-
tile. In fact, much like the publicity process, 
public experience – socially lived experience – 
exists between the individual and society. 
However, we use these terms (individual and 
society) only for the convenience of designat-
ing two different regimes of social action. The 
expressions of lived experiences that constitute 
the publicity experience indicate precisely, as 
we pointed out, this alternation between the 
subjective and objectified subjectivity, between 
an experience that is lived individually and 
socially.
William James’ theory about the affective 
experience helps us understand this reasoning 
that makes the public experience a trans-indi-
vidual phenomenon. According to the author of 
the expression “pure experience”, we inhabit a 
universe of experiences which are not marked 
by unicity or fixedness but instead, constitute 
a hybrid and ambiguous universe where the 
experiences of our emotions are not intuitive 
contents of interiority. The ambivalence of the 
affective experience illustrates, as James shows, 
that subjectivity and objectivity are not issues of 
experience but of its very classification (James 
1905: 282). Experience takes the form of lived 
experiences or of the publicity dimension, ac-
cording to the perspective that is imposed on 
it. James observes: 
“it surely can be nothing intrinsic in the in-
dividual experience. It is their way of behaving 
towards each other, their system of relations, 
their function; and all these things vary with 
the context in which we find it opportune to 
consider them” (James 1905: 287).
Just as the line of the horizon moves with 
the subject who observes, so the experience, as 
Alfred, Lord Tennyson writes, moves accord-
ing to what we do with it (Tennyson 2007). 
Public experience corresponds therefore to a 
translocation of experience, an association that 
brings together individualized experiences but 
which are collectively experienced. This is their 
communal and communicational sense: the re-
verberation of experience through the alveolar 
spaces between the singular and plural defini-
tions of individual. This point allows clarifying 
the importance that technological devices of 
symbolic mediation have in the functioning of 
the present societies and of public experience. 
Public experience consists of the lived experi-
ences that become common property, sharable 
and trivialized8. Now, media participate in this 
mundane communication of experience and 
sharing of lived experiences (cf. Woodley-Baker 
2009). The communication they operate, works 
as an opportunity, available to each individual, 
to receive the experience of others. And some 
of its programming – as in the case of real-
ity TV shows or newscasts – assumes without 
embarrassment the trend of communicating 
the experience of otherness, in presenting an 
experience that lies beyond the immediate 
experience of the individual. Public experience 
is reborn here, in the constant widening of the 
horizons of experience: 
“What is accessible only to that individual, 
what takes place only in the field of his own 
inner life, must be stated in its relationship to 
the situation within which it takes place. One 
individual has one experience and another has 
another experience, and both are stated in terms 
of their biographies; but there is in addition 
that which is common to the experience of all” 
(Mead 1992: 33).
What belongs to the experience of all is 
precisely the public experience, is the sentence 
that seems to follow naturally. Experience, as 
we hoped to have demonstrated in the argu-
mentation we developed, is purposeful; it is not 
substantive. Its publicity dimension is therefore 
located in the interactions that are established 
between the singular and plural definitions of 
the individual and the social world.
8 In the positive sense of something that subtly spills 
over and pervades the flow of days. 
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Conclusions
Experience, as trans-individual phenomenon, is 
a part of the publicity process which is charac-
terized precisely by the objectification, figura-
tion, representation, dramatization, in short, the 
expression of lived experience (Erlebnis).
By placing publicness of experience on the 
side of Erlebnis we are not precluding it from 
being associated with the experience in the 
sense of Erfhärung. Public experience is also 
journey and danger, it is also an event. But it 
does not end there: it constitutes itself between 
the singular and plural definition of the indi-
vidual (society) and it is in that extent that the 
publicity dimension of experience lends itself 
to be understood as something lived, felt and 
concurred.
Public experience is experience (Erfahrung) 
but is simultaneously lived experience 
(Erlebnis), subjectivity that is figured on the 
materiality or symbolicity of the world and is 
expressed objectively as a means of being ap-
prehended, interpreted and accommodated 
by the individual. There is, thus, like a circle 
that is filled and restarted (from subjectivity to 
objectivity, then to subjectivity again returning 
to objectivity, and so on ad infinitum). In The 
Social Construction of Reality Peter L. Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann describe this process 
divided by the phases of externalization, objec-
tification and integration (Berger, Luckmann 
1989). The power of experience – as we know 
since Aristotle – consists of the productive dis-
position that gives the individual the possibility 
to do something (Gregorić, Grgić 2006: 14). 
Experience allows us to do things. If I have the 
experience of an articulated table (which I know 
is made of separate parts united by hinges), I 
can reduce its volume and make it more plane 
(the passage from the three-dimensional to the 
two-dimensional). And by transforming the re-
lation of the object with the world, I have modi-
fied my own experience of the table. The same 
occurs within public experience: each lived expe-
rience added to the publicity process of societies 
is a new opportunity for the transformation 
of Experience. And each new transformation 
of Experience is an opportunity for its acting 
upon the social reality in which we live. Let us 
take the recent example of the Portuguese song 
“Grândola, Vila Morena” (English: Grândola, 
Village Tanned by the Sun), where the new lived 
experience of the song has transformed the 
experience that the Portuguese had of it. It was 
that new experience that allowed an action on 
the world, an interpellation and intervention on 
Portuguese society. The song as protest against 
the old regime of Estado Novo (English: New 
State) is now being used by the citizens who 
reclaim their voice in the democratic system in 
which they live.
However, this intensification of the experi-
ence that comes by its resurgence has a particu-
lar impact when associated with publicity: to 
the extent that it exercises “lived experiences”, 
the growth trend of the experience entails a 
very particular sense. The public experience 
grows horizontally as it challenges the social 
experience on the same level of generality; that 
is, lived experiences contribute to a shared col-
lective experience that is added to those that un-
derlie it – universal integration of the particular. 
And, at the same time, public experience grows 
vertically in the sense that it confers a par-
ticular integration of the universal, and where 
experiences are true cultural expressions or 
“objectified spirits” (objectiver Geist) as Dilthey 
wrote. We are able to understand the practi-
cal and immediate experience, but we are also 
able, from this vertical growth of experience, 
to experiment mediated realities, which – in 
spite of not experiencing them directly – are 
part of our own experience. As can easily be 
seen, it is this vertical exponentiation of public 
experience that is most subject to mediatization. 
Indeed, media operate not only the symbolic 
mediation of the world; they also operate, in 
a particularly idiosyncratic way9, the very me-
9 The uniqueness of the technological devices of sym-
bolic mediation is confirmed by the number of gra-
duates in communication, which has increased in 
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diatization of experience. Both of these growths 
– horizontal and vertical – of the experience 
occur in public experience because publicity 
involves the expressions of lived experiences 
and because publicity, in its communicative 
role, possesses interpretive schemes common 
to all. Schütz mentioned the “scheme of our 
experience” (Schemata von unserer Erfahrung) 
(Schutz 1967: 122) as contexts of meaning. 
Similarly, public experience seems to be covered 
by layers of experiential schemes characterized 
by the mutual conditioning of individuals and 
by the construction – via communicational 
phenomena – of complex interactive patterns, 
capable of delimiting the experience, on the 
level of the singular definition of individual, 
much Norbert Elias tells us (1970), and on the 
level of the plural definition of the individual, 
which we call society.
To sum up, public experience is, then, the 
experience of a shared world, where singular 
and plural definitions of individual converge 
through lived experiences, and more particu-
larly so through the expression of these lived ex-
periences, which can take on different symbolic 
forms (figurations, imaginary, representations, 
rituals, dramatizations). By articulating the 
particular and the universal, Experience does 
not remain the same. Once the experiences of 
one turn into the experiences of many – or as 
collective experiences are internalized – there 
is a transfiguration of experience, in which 
the very nature of the interactions between 
individuals and between individuals and the 
world is revolutionized. Social reality encloses 
a public experience made  of externalizations, 
an experience that is both experiencing and 
experimentation, and it is this ambivalence 
that best characterizes the publicity process as 
a process that encompasses lived experiences 
and causes their flow.
recent decades. Indeed, the multiplication of rese-
arch and studies in communication, as well as disci-
plinary specialization around the “Communication 
sciences” marks, with particular clarity, the recogni-
tion of the importance of addressing the phenome-
na of mediatization as an object of study.
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kOkIa galI BŪtI VIeŠOjI PatIRtIS – aPIe VIeŠUMĄ,  
kOMUnIkaCIjĄ IR IŠgYVentŲ PatIRčIŲ IŠRaIŠkĄ
Samuel MateUS
Viešosios patirties idėja dažnai remiamasi skirtinguose socialiniuose ir akademiniuose kontekstuose. Tačiau 
retai sąmoningai imamasi specifiškai pagilinti jos reikšmę iš socialinio gyvenimo perspektyvos. Manome, kad 
vienas iš geriausių būdų, kuriuo remdamiesi galime nagrinėti viešąją patirtį, yra kultūros objektyvavimas, 
plėtojimas ir inscenizavimas, t. y. „išgyventų patirčių reiškimas“. Viešojoje sferoje tai – simultaniškas individu-
alios ir kolektyvinės patirčių skirstymas, ir šia prasme galime suprasti, kokią įtaką kultūra daro pačios patirties 
formavimuisi. Viešąją patirtį charakterizuoja individo ir visuomenės persiskverbimo procese besiaudžiančios 
bei besusipinančios individualiai išgyventos ir bendrai perimtos patirtys bei bendrai išgyventos ir individualiai 
perimtos patirtys. Patirties ir viešumo santykis kyla iš simbolinės bendruomenės, kurią apima minčių sistemos 
ir visuomenių veiksmai. Remiantis norima iškelti hipoteze, lemiamas viešumo principo vaidmuo patirties 
atžvilgiu pasireiškia darant prieinamą ir komunikuojamą socialinį pasaulį, kuriame skleidžiasi simbolinė 
(kultūrinė) veikla. Tokiu atveju viešoji patirtis suprantama kaip bendrai gyvenamo pasaulio patirtis, kuriame 
tiek individualios, tiek bendramatės individo (suprantamo kaip visuomenė) apibrėžtys suartėja per išgyventas 
patirtis, o ypač per jų reiškimąsi, įgaunantį skirtingas simbolines formas. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Erfahrung, Erlebnis, patirtis, išgyventų patirčių išraiška, viešumo principas, viešoji 
patirtis, viešoji sfera, Wilhelmas Dilthey’us.
